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This past term, in Missouri v. Frye1 and Lafler v. Cooper2, the
Supreme Court confirmed that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel applies to the plea negotiation process and held
that prejudicial error can flow from ineffective plea advice.
The defense community has applauded these decisions for
recognizing the pivotal role that guilty pleas play in our
criminal justice system and for requiring a minimum level
of efficacy in plea lawyering. Although some have expressed
concern about the implementation of the two decisions,3
others argue they will lead to better plea policies within
prosecutors’ offices and closer judicial supervision of plea
deals.4 In this brief essay I want to suggest that Frye and
Lafler are victories for the defense community in yet
another way. The decisions reflect judicial realism, and in
this respect, they are especially important cases for systemic
public defense litigation.
Both opinions, authored by Justice Kennedy, are firmly
rooted in the realities of today’s criminal justice system.
The Frye decision held that counsel’s failure to notify a client of a favorable plea offer constitutes ineffective assistance,5 and in Lafler the Court found that counsel’s
mistaken view of the law, which induced the defendant to
reject a plea and go to trial, was equally ineffective.6 If the
four dissenting Justices had had their way, the cases would
have been dismissed on the grounds that (1) there is no
constitutional right to a plea offer,7 and (2) in any event, the
subsequent trial in Lafler’s case and the plea agreement in
Frye’s case ‘‘wipe[d] clean any deficient performance by
defense counsel during plea bargaining.’’8 Yet the majority
in both cases rejected the claim that the Sixth Amendment
protects only the right to a fair trial.9
The Frye decision noted that 97% of federal convictions
and 94% of state convictions are secured through guilty
pleas.10 In light of that fact, the Frye Court held that, in most
cases, the plea bargaining process is ‘‘the critical point for
a defendant,’’11 and thus ‘‘it is insufficient simply to point to
the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any
errors in the pre-trial process.’’12 By recognizing that the plea
negotiation process is not simply an ‘‘adjunct to the criminal
justice system,’’13 but, in fact, its defining feature, the Court
embraced realism in its Sixth Amendment case law.
Because the Lafler and Frye decisions reflect such pragmatism, they may prove to be powerful precedent for
defense reform advocates who seek relief in court. Too
often, courts dealing with public defense reform litigation
decide cases in a formalistic way that prevents the underlying constitutional issues from being addressed. For

example, federal courts historically have refused to hear
systemic public defense suits on abstention grounds.14
At the same time, state courts have viewed public defense
reform as a legislative prerogative, directing plaintiffs to the
political process.15
In recent years, there have been some notable successes
in defense reform litigation,16 but plaintiffs who claim that
an entire public defense system is broken regularly face the
same two formalistic arguments from lawyers for the
defendant states: first, that legislatures, not courts, are best
suited to generate indigent defense reform, and second,
that plaintiffs should pursue their claims in postconviction
proceedings. Courts that accept this former argument
ignore two realities: (1) legislatures are unlikely to take up
indigent defense reform because there is no lobby for such
an effort, and (2) courts do have a role to play in defining
constitutional rights, even when those definitions implicitly
call upon legislators to allocate funding.17 Courts that accept
the second argument—that postconviction is the most
appropriate avenue for relief—also ignore reality. Specifically, these courts overlook three practical facts: (1) postconviction relief is retrospective and thus inappropriate
when a party seeks prospective, systemic reform18; (2)
individual defendants rarely prevail in an ineffective assistance claim because the legal standard insulates even the
most egregious cases of inefficacy19; and (3) individual
habeas relief in state or federal court does not allow
a defendant to demonstrate features of an entire system
that may have contributed to, if not caused, ineffective
lawyering in one particular case. When courts dismiss
public defense reform suits, arguing that these suits present insurmountable separation of powers concerns or that
an alternative remedy is available—even though in name
only—these courts value formalism over the practical realities that face criminal defendants today.
The Lafler-Frye decisions offer a counterpoint to that
kind of formalism, and counsel in current public defense
suits should leverage these decisions accordingly. Two
current defense reform suits deserve mention, one recently
decided in Missouri and one ongoing in Florida. In Missouri, the indigent defense function has been struggling for
years because of insufficient funding and excessive caseloads.20 In 2007, the Missouri Public Defender Commission adopted a protocol for determining the maximum
number of cases that each of its offices could effectively
handle.21 In 2010, having attempted to implement this
protocol and its workload limits, the state public defender
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filed a motion to set aside the appointment of new cases
until workloads dropped to a point at which defense attorneys could handle new cases.22
The trial court judge overruled the motion and held he
had no choice but to appoint the public defender—effectively thwarting the defender office’s workload protocol
altogether.23 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court
considered whether the public defender, under its current
regulations, could refuse new cases when its workload
prevents effective representation of additional clients.24 In
a 4-3 decision, the state Supreme Court held that the public
defender acted pursuant to valid regulatory authority in
devising its workload protocol, and thus its refusal of
additional cases was lawful. Moreover, the Court’s opinion
makes clear that the refusal of new cases was also appropriate in light of prevailing ethical standards and the Sixth
Amendment requirement that indigent defendants have
effective and ‘‘not just pro forma, representation.’’25 In its
ruling, the majority dealt with the realities of Missouri’s
indigent defense workload crisis, rejecting the argument of
mootness that has plagued past defense reform suits.
The Miami-Dade County Public Defender’s office in
Florida can only hope for a similar outcome in its pending
case. Florida statutory law currently bars courts from
allowing a public defender to withdraw from a case because
of an excessive workload.26 Since 2008, not only has the
public defender in Miami-Dade County been seeking
withdrawal from cases because of workload concerns, but
the office has also challenged the constitutionality of this
statutory language.27 The public defender has argued that
its attorneys have a professional and constitutional obligation to decline new cases when they have reached their
workload capacity. The Florida Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in this case in June,28 and it is not clear when
a decision will be released.
The Missouri and Florida cases are not simply cases
about whether the state legislature has the right to intrude
upon the state court’s own internal management or
whether a public defender office has the statutory right to
control its workloads using internally generated metrics. In
both jurisdictions excessive caseloads are a glaring fact—by
any measure. In Florida, one of the assistant public defenders whose caseload was at the heart of the lawsuit handled
more than 700 felonies and more than 200 pleas at
arraignment in fiscal year 2008–2009.29 In Missouri,
a 2009 state Supreme Court opinion dealing with the issue
of excessive caseloads documented that state defenders had
the capacity to ‘‘spend only 7.7 hours per case, including
trial, appellate and capital cases.’’30 When attorneys are
operating under such crushing workloads, they are not
capable of providing anything close to effective representation. These obvious, practical realities should inform state
courts considering public defense reform suits, just as
actual facts about the practice of criminal law today
informed the Lafler-Frye decisions.
It is unlikely the Supreme Court even considered
public defense litigation when it rendered decisions in the

Lafler-Frye cases. Nonetheless, attorneys seeking public
defense reform in court can now point to the realism of
the Supreme Court in deciding Sixth Amendment cases.
At least one such attorney has already done so. In his
closing argument, Parker D. Thompson, counsel for the
Miami-Dade County Public Defender, mentioned Lafler
and Frye explicitly and discussed the reality of his client’s
workload.31 According to the evidence on record, the
public defender testified that in 40–50% of his cases, he
had no opportunity to brief his clients before they entered
a plea. As Mr. Thompson said in closing, ‘‘the public
defender has to deal with reality.’’ Courts presiding over
public defense reform suits should do the same, and the
Lafler-Frye decisions enable such a stance.
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grounds of nonjusticiability; order vacated on reconsideration
by Duncan v. State, 488 Mich. 957 (2010)); State v. Bowens,
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See, e.g., Hurrell-Harring v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 8 (N.Y. 2010)
(holding that indigent defendants stated a claim for constructive denial of Sixth Amendment right to counsel.). In the
Michigan public defense class action mentioned, supra note 15,
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ultimately allowed the suit to move forward. See David Carroll,
Gideon Alert: As Michigan Supreme Court Again Reinstates ACLU
Duncan Lawsuit, the Race to the Bottom Continues in Chippewa
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prospective relief. The Sixth Amendment protects rights that
do not affect the outcome of a trial. Thus, deficiencies that do
not meet the ‘ineffectiveness’ standard may nonetheless
violate a defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment. In the
post-trial context, such errors may be deemed harmless
because they did not affect the outcome of the trial. Whether an
accused has been prejudiced by the denial of a right is an issue
that relates to relief—whether the defendant is entitled to have
his or her conviction overturned—rather than to the question of
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